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This Essay examines recent charges of political motivation against the Department
ofjustice and its enlforcement of the Voting Rights Act. These accusations appear
well-deserved, on the strength of the Department's recent handling of the Texas
redistrictingsubmission and Georgia's voting identjfication requirement. This Essay
reaches two conclusions. First, it is clear that Congress wished to secure its
understandingof the Act into the future through its preclearance requirement. Many
critics of the voting rights bill worried about the degree of discretion that the
legislation accorded the Attorney General. Supporters worried as well, for this degree
of discretion might lead to under-enforcement of the Act. Yet Congress chose not to
act on those concerns while placing the Department ofJustice at the center of its
voting rights revolution. By and large, this is the way that the Supreme Court has
understood the Department's role. Second, the currently available data do not
support the charge that politics has played a central role in the Department's
enforcement of its preclearance duties. This conclusion holds true for preclearance
decisions up until the Clinton years. The data are ambiguous with respect to the
Justice Department of President George W. Bush.
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As you know, this Committee is deeply concerned with what appears
to be a trend within the Department ofJustice ("DOJ") away from
vigorous prosecution of civil rights cases.1
The opinions and expertise of the career lawyers are valued and respected and continue to be an integralpart of the internal deliberation
process upon which the department heavily relies when making litigation decisions.
INTRODUCTION
This Essay examines the alleged politicization of the Voting Rights
Act of 1965, and particularly its preclearance provision, at the hands of the
Justice Department.' This issue has gained much currency in recent years,
most notably in Texas. When Texas Governor Rick Perry called the legislature into special session in order to draw a new districting plan, Senate
Democrats fled to a neighboring state in order to avoid a quorum. Republicans contended that the new plan was a necessary fix for a prior
Democratic gerrymander, yet the facts left little doubt that Republicans
were extracting as much political gain from their proposal as census numbers would allow. Lines were stretched, communities split, incumbents
paired or moved away from their districts. In a constitutional world where
Vieth v.Jubelireris controlling law,4 there are very few limits on the role of
politics in electoral line-drawing.
As a covered jurisdiction under Section 4 of the Voting Rights Act,
however, Texas political elites were not yet in the clear. Under federal law,
the state must seek preclearance for its redistricting plan from the Department of Justice ("the DOJ"). That is, within 60 days of submission,
Texas had the burden of showing, to the satisfaction of the DOJ, that its
plan had neither the purpose nor the effect of denying the right to vote
on account of race or color. In light of the low-some might say nonexistent-rate of denials, this final hurdle could not have seemed all that
imposing.
And yet, in a 73-page memo, the staff in the voting section of the
DOJ concluded that the "[t]he State of Texas has not met its burden in
showing that the proposed congressional redistricting plan does not have
1.
Letter from Arlen Specter, Chairman of the United States Senate Committee on
the Judiciary, to Alberto Gonzales, United States Attorney General (Nov. 22, 2005) (on file
with projectvote.org).
2.
Dan Eggen, Staff Opinions Banned in Voting Rights Cases, WASH. POST, Dec. 10,
2005, at A03 (e-mail from Eric Holland, DOJ spokesman, to the Washington Post).
3.
See Daniel P. Tokaji, If It's Broke, Fix It: Improving Voting Rights Act Preclearance,49
How. LJ. 785 (2006).
4.
541 U.S. 267 (2004).
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a discrinminatory effect.''5 These lawyers and analysts thus recommended
that the Department interpose an objection under Section 5 of the Act.
Given this recommendation, the matter should have ended until Texas
offered a reworked plan.
In a surprising turn of events, however, senior officials at the DOJ
overruled the staffers and approved the plan.6 This was very unusual for,
according to Mark Posner, a former DOJ attorney,"[i]n this kind of situation, where everybody agrees at least on the staff level ... that is a very,
very strong case."7 And further, "[t]he fact that everybody agreed that
there were reductions in minority voting strength, and that they were significant, raises a lot of questions as to why" the plan was approved.8
Unlike most others, this approval by DOJ made news, as the staff memo
was leaked to the press.'
The Texas vignette has not proven to be an isolated incident. In
2005, for example, the state of Georgia passed a voter-identification law
intended to curb voter fraud.1 0 DOJ staffers reviewed the plan and similarly concluded that the state of Georgia failed to show that the law
would not discriminate against voters of color."1 Yet a day after receiving
the memo, John Tanner, chief of the voting rights section, wrote a letter to
the state of Georgia informing its officials that DOJ would not interpose
an objection to their plan. 2
These examples raise important questions about the Voting Rights
Act and its enforcement by the DOJ. As a consequence of these types of
events, commentators have focused on whether the DOJ's enforcement of
the Act is motivated in part by crass partisan aims. This is an important
question and in the first Part we provide a tentative answer. Using our
13
database of all objection letters from the DOJ to covered jurisdictions,
we examine whether patterns of objections exist from each administration. The evidence is decidedly mixed and does not allow us to conclude
5.
Section 5 Recommendation Memorandum from the Department of Justice
(Dec. 12, 2003), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ wp-srv/nation/documents/
texasDOJmemo.pdf.
6.
Dan Eggen,Justice Staff Saw Texas Districting as Illegal, WASH. POST, Dec 2, 2005,
at A01.
7.
Id.(quoting Mark Posner, longtime lawyer at the Department ofJustice).
8.
Id.
9.
Id.
10.
See David H Harris,Jr., Georgia Photo ID Requirement: ProofPositive of the Need to
Extend Section 5, 28 N.C. CENT. L.J. 172,172 (2006).
11.
See Dan Eggen, Criticism of Voting Law was Overruled, WASH. POST, Nov. 17 2005,
at A01.
12.
Id.
13.
See Luis Fuentes- Rohwer & Guy Uriel E. Charles, PreClearance,Discrimination,
and the Department ofjustice: The Case of South Carolina,57 S. C. L. REv. 827 (2006); GuyUriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Rethinking Section 5, in THE FUTURE OF THEVOTINC. RIGHTS ACT 38 (Epstein et al. eds., 2006).
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that partisan politics-not law-played a predominant role in the preclearance process. This is true up until the mid-1990's, a time when
enforcement of the preclearance requirement took a decidedly drastic
drop. We attribute this drop to the Court's Miller v.Johnson decision, a time
when the Court made amply clear both where the bounds of administrative enforcement were and how far beyond them DOJ had overstepped."4
The data for the Bush Administration continues this steep downward
trend and leaves open the question of partisan enforcement by the DOJ
post-2000.
In Part II we shift the inquiry. Assuming that the critics are right,
and that partisan politics have played a central role in the preclearance
process, we ask whether there should be cause for concern. In Part II, we
contend that Congress was fully cognizant in 1965 of the costs and benefits of vesting on the Attorney General discretionary preclearance powers.
Politics have been inherent in this process since its inception. Notably, the
Supreme Court has given this process its considerable blessing. As we discuss in our Conclusion, the real insight of this debate lies in the lessons it
imparts for communities of color. We discuss two lessons in particular.
First, it is clear to us that the voting rights of communities of color under
Section 5 of the Act are subject to the ebbs and flows of politics. This is
part of the bargain.Yet, second, we are not altogether sure that this is a bad
thing. After all, what is best for communities of color remains a matter of
considerable debate and disagreement. And so, while aggressive enforcement of the statute remains a normatively attractive position in the
abstract, we are not convinced that DOJ always knows what is best for
communities of color.
I. THE ACT AS APPLIED: AVIEW FROM THE COVERED JURISDICTIONS

The objection letters from the DOJ to covered jurisdictions tell a
poignant and powerful story about the role of the federal government
under the Act. Note, first, a point we have made in our prior work: on the
strength of raw data alone, it is clear that something is amiss., 5 As Table 1
shows, the number of objections by decade shows a steady trajectory up
until the end of the 1990's.16 Yet, in the first five years of the Bush Administration, the numbers dropped calamitously.

14.
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
15.
Unless otherwise noted, all data in this Part is derived from our earlier work. See
Guy Uriel E. Charles & Luis Fuentes- Rohwer, On the Renewal of Section 5 of the VRA: Why
Congress Failed Voters of Color, in MAKING EVERY VOTE COUNT: FEDERAL ELECTION LEGISLATION IN THE STATES 44 (2006). See also Fuentes-Rohwer & Charles, supra note 13.
16.
See id.
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TABLE I
OBJECTION BY DECADE,

Decade

1965-2005

Objections

1965-69

10

1970-79

334

1980-89
1990-99

360
342

2000-05

36

Total

1,068

In fairness, this number-thirty-six objections-is only for half a
decade.Yet at best, doubling the number would amount to only seventytwo objections for the entire decade, still far below previous decades.
But this is raw data, after all, and so the relevant comparison is the
number of objections in relation to the number of submissions. After all, if
the number of submissions is dropping sharply, the number of objections
might be lower yet still commensurate to the percentages from previous
years. We undertake this comparison, as displayed on Table 2. The results
are not much better.
TABLE 2
OBJECTIONS AND SUBMISSIONS BY DECADE, 1970-2005
Decade

Submissions

Objections

Percentage

1970-79

221

389"

1.8%

1980-89
1990-99

33,435
152,931

363
356

.01
.002

2000-05

44,161

36

.0008

Note that in the early years, up until the end of the 1970's, DOJ objected to 1.8% of all submissions. This is the highest percentage from all
decades, as it should be. Congress expected that the special provisions of
the Act-such as the preclearance requirement-would be in place for
five years, after which the discriminatory practices would diminish considerably and the need for Section 5 would also lessen. The data supports
this expectation.The decade of the 1980's saw the number drop to 0.01%,
due in great measure to the steep jump in submissions. A similar drop and
justification applies to the 1990's.
However, the pattern is very different for the Bush Administration.
To be sure, submissions dropped sharply for the years after 2000, and we

17.
This number represents the total number of objection letters, including objection letters to resubmissions and requests for new information.
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can only conjecture as to the reasons for this drop.The drop in objections
from the DOJ, however, is incommensurate to this drop in submissions as
compared to previous years.Without more, it demands an explanation.
Before venturing to offer an explanation, we take one final look at
the data. In Table 3, we document the number of objection letters from
DOJ to covered jurisdictions as catalogued by administration. If the DOJ
enforced the Act in a partisan way, we ought to see the effect of partisan
enforcement in the number of objection letters interposed by the DOJ."8
More specifically, we would expect Democratic administrations to enforce
the Act with great vigor, and Republican administrations much less so.
Our point need not take a view of administrative enforcement comparable to the approach taken by the Bush administration in recent years.
Rather, the point is that those who consistently criticize the Act or disagree with its goals can be expected to be far less solicitous in its
enforcement. This posture was particularly true in the early years of the
Act, and may be said to have continued into the Reagan years, a staunch
supporter of states rights' and principles of federalism, much less eager in
fighting racial discrimination.
TABLE

3

OBJECTION LETTERS BY ADMINISTRATION,

Alabama
Arizona
California
Georgia
Louisiana
Mississippi
New York
North Carolina
South Carolina
South Dakota
Texas
Virginia
JTotal:

1965-i98I

Johnson

Nixon

Ford

Carter

8/65-1169

1169-8174

8/74-1/77

1/77-1/81

0
0
0
3
0
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
4

11
3
0
30
37
25
1
5
13
0
0
8
133

17
4
1
22
7
15
4
4
20
0
32
3
129

7
5
2
27
6
15
1
13
19
3
58
2
158

The numbers tell a surprising story. In the early years of the Act, the
DOJ did little by way of enforcement, unsure about the kinds of changes
subject to review. This was one of the reasons offered by supporters of the
Act in 1969 for extending the preclearance requirement for five years.
18.
For the purposes of this Essay, we assume, all thing being equal, that a paucity of
objection letters reflect a lack of support for the Act.
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The numbers for the Nixon administration, however, are nothing short of
staggering. Recall in this vein President Nixon's "Southern Strategy" and
his states' rights pledge during the 1968 campaign.1 9 Consider also the
criticism from his Attorney General, John Mitchell, during the 1969 debates over extension of the Act. On this evidence, we would expect
lackadaisical support for enforcement of the preclearance requirement at
best. Instead, the number of objections increased manifold and, more tellingly, they compare favorably with the numbers from the Ford and Carter
administrations. Note also how, in its shortened term of office, the Ford
administration objected to 129 submissions, an even higher ratio than the
Carter administration.
In this vein, and as Table 4 suggests, the Reagan administration enforced the preclearance requirement with as much vigor as previous
administrations. Over the course of two terms, in fact, the number of objections-306-surpassed every other administration's. And over the
course of one term, President G. H. Bush's objections numbers were even
comparatively higher. The numbers for the Clinton administration came
down sharply, once his length of office is factored in, yet still remained
quite respectable. In fact, as we have argued elsewhere, the real story for
the 19 90's lies in explaining what happened mid-decade, when a steep
decline in objections becomes quite noticeable. We offered the Court's
Miller v.Johnson20 decision as an intervening variable that would explain
this drastic drop in objections.2"
TABLE 4
OBJECTION LETTERS BY ADMINISTRATION, 1981-2005

Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
California
Florida
Georgia
Louisiana
Mississippi
New York
North Carolina
South Carolina
19.

Reagan

Bush

Clinton

Bush

1/81-1/89

1/89-1/93

1/93-1/01

1/01-

38
0
7
0
3
42
18
73
3
33
43

18
0
5
1
1
22
35
46
2
8
16

9
2
3
2
1
25
37
34
5
6
21

0
0
2
1
1
4
4
1
0
1
9

See STEPHEN E. AMBROSE, NIXON: TRIUMPH OF A POLITICIAN, 1962-1972, at 89-

90 (1989).
20.
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
21.
See Charles & Fuentes-tohwer, supra note 13, at 842.
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Reagan

Bush

Clinton

Bush

1/81-1,89

1/89-1193

1/93-1101

1/01-

South Dakota

0

0

1

0

Texas

37

44

35

4

Virginia

9

4

3

5

306

202

184

32

Total:

This data makes clear, once again, that the Bush administration is the
outlier administration in the story of Section 5 enforcement. And so the
real question is, how to explain it?
One explanation is Miller and the Supreme Court's chastening of
aggressive preclearance enforcement. On this argument, objections by
DOJ would show no discernible change until 1995, the year Miller was
decided. Beginning in 1995, the numbers would show a significant drop
through the rest of the decade, and into the next. Consider in this vein
Table 5, which breaks down the objections for the decade of the 1990's
by year.
TABLE 5
OBJECTIONS BYYEAR, 1990-2000
Percent
Objections

Percent
Change

Year

Objections

1990
1991

31

9

-

72

20

+132

1992

76

21

+5

1993

71

20

-7

1994

51

14

-28

1995
1996
1997

25
8
10

7
3
3

-51
-68
+25

1998

7

2

-30

1999
2000

5
4

1
1

-29
-20

These numbers tell a powerful story. From 1990 to 1994, the DOJ
interposed 301 objections, which accounted for 84% of the objections for
the entire decade.Yet in 1995, DOJ interposed half as many objections as
the year before, and only thirty-four more objections the rest of the decade. Something is clearly amiss here. Further, notice the sharp decline in
the percentage of objections from 1994 to 1996. The bottom appears to
have fallen out of DOJ's perception of its role during this period, as the
percent change of objections dropped 51 and 68 percent respectively.
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A second prong of this argument as applied to the Bush administration looks to the Bossier Parrish II case, decided in 2000.22 In this case, the
Court concluded that the preclearance inquiry was essentially a retrogression inquiry, irrespective of any finding of discriminatory intent.23 In
other words, DOJ need only inquire whether the change under review
makes matters worse for voters of color than before the change. This case
is commonly noted as the reason for the dearth of objections by DOJ
since the year 2000.
The argument that judicial doctrine affected the actions of DOJ and
its perception about the demands of the Voting Rights Act presupposes
two things: first, that the doctrine is binding on DOJ at all; and second,
that the Bush DOJ would in fact be chastened by anything the Court, or
any other institution, would tell it to do or not to do. On the first point, it
is clear to us that the doctrine is broad enough, and accords DOJ enough
discretion, as to foreclose few avenues of enforcement.25 We do not take a
strong view on the second point, yet cautiously observe that the Bush
administration has demonstrated a penchant for asserting a strong view of
its powers across the board. It would be surprising to see it take a back
seat in this area, or any other, to the Court.
A second explanation points to a lack of eagerness to enforce the
statute. This is the "ideological" explanation offered by many. The data
show that an explanation is necessary to understand the paucity of objections. While it hard to conclude that the Act was administered in a
partisan way from 1970 through 1995, that explanation remains a possibility, especially after 2000.

22.
23.
24.

Reno v. Bossier Parish Sch. B., 528 U.S. 320 (2000).
Id. at 325.
See Peyton McCrary, Christopher Seaman, and RichardValelly, The End of Pre-

clearance as We Knew It: How the Supreme Court Transformed Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act,
11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 275 (2006); see also Peyton McCreary, How the Voting Rights Act
Works: Inplementation of a Civil Rights Policy, 1965-2005, 57 S.C. L. REv. 785, 823 (2006)
("In the guise of making the definition of purpose under Section 5 congruent with the
definition of retrogressive effect, the decision effectively minimized use of Section 5 as a
weapon for protecting minority voters from discrimination."); Meghann E. Donahue,
"The Reports of My Death are Greatly Exae(gerated":AdministeringSection 5 of the Voting Rights
Act After Georiia v. Ashcroft, 104 COLUM. L. REv. 1651, 1661 (2004) ("The formerly robust
purpose inquiry-routinely applied by the Department, almost certainly intended by
Congress, and universally interpreted as applying to unconstitutional discrimination prior
to Bossier Parish Il-has now been limited to the unlikely instance of the 'incompetent
retrogressor': a jurisdiction that has intended-but failed-to effect a retrogression in minorities' 'effective exercise of the electoral franchise.' ").

25.

See Fuentes-Rohwer and Charles, supra note 13, at 851.
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II. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION IN EXECUTIVE
HANDS:TTHE POLITICS OF THE ACT

For the remainder of this Essay, however, we assume partisan enforcement of the Act. The question for us is whether there is anything
wrong with a fair amount of partisanship in section 5 enforcement. As this
Part argues, to conclude that there is nothing wrong with partisan enforcement of the Act is not a radical conclusion in light of the statutory
discretion at the heart of the section 5 power. Section II.A examines the
normative bureaucratic tension in enforcing the Voting Rights Act between political appointees-such as the Attorney General-and the career
staff at the Department of Justice. Section II.B contends that this tension
was explicitly reflected during the debates over enactment and extension
of the preclearance requirement. These debates underscore both the need
for discretion in enforcing the statute and the level of trust placed at the
hands of the Attorney General. Finally, Section II.C discusses the interpretive role played by the Attorney General in the doctrinal development of
the Act. This Part concludes that the 89th Congress understood the danger of over- and under-enforcement inherent in the statutory scheme.
Recent charges of ideological enforcement should not be surprising.
A. PoliticalAppointees and Career Staff.Tensions?
The preclearance provision of the Voting Rights Act, Section 5, has
an intrinsic yet misleading simplicity. The language of the statute could
not be any more familiar to modern ears: the Attorney General must ensure that the submitted change "does not have the purpose and will not
have the effect of denying or abridging the right to vote on account of
race or color."26 This language tracks constitutional doctrine and makes
clear that Congress was simply moving the constitutional inquiry ahead,
prior to implementation, and placing the DOJ-or the D.C. District
Court-in charge of its enforcement.
Enforcement of the law began in earnest after the Court's Allen decision in 1969. Once DOJ began to take its duties under the law seriously,
lines of responsibility were quickly established.27 The Attorney General
soon delegated her preclearance responsibility under the statute to the
Assistant Attorney General for Civil Rights-a presidential appointeewho in turn relied heavily on the advice of the career staff in the Voting
Section. This staff would investigate submissions and prepare a written
26.
Voting Rights Act of 1965 § 5; 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b) (2000).
27.
For the description that follows, we rely heavily on Mark A. Posner, The Politicization of Justice Department Decisionmaking Under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act: Is it a
Problem and What Should Congress Do?,Working Paper, American Constitution Society for
Law and Policy 7-9 (January 2006).
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analysis, which would include an examination of the facts and an application of the law to these facts, as well as a recommendation to the Assistant
Attorney General about how the Department should respond to the
submission-whether it should approve the submission, object, or ask for
more information.
Given this process, the question is normative in kind: what would
we expect a bureaucracy to do when interpreting the relevant body of
laws? Or more specifically, what would we expect the DOJ to do when
interpreting and enforcing Section 5 of the Act?28 Intuition takes us in
two separate directions. For the career staff, we would expect them to
apply the law as they understand it and to do what the Court tells them
to do. Consider in this vein the following account from the career staff at
the offices of the Solicitor General and Legal Counsel. These offices "are
staffed with legal generalists whose only specialty is the law, who are free
of policy or programmatic responsibilities, and who are called upon to
take a broader and longer view of the Constitution than other employees
in the executive branch"' 29 This rendition applies with equal force to the
Voting Section staff at the Civil Rights Division. This is also a clear mes30
sage from the leaked memo from the recent Texas submission.
As for the Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General, our
expectations are clearly different. As political appointees, we would expect
them to carry out the principles and goals of the administration. We
would expect them, in other words, to pursue "policy or programmatic
responsibilities" and to take a narrower and shorter view of the Constitution. The recent Texas and Georgia submissions appear to offer examples
of this expectation.
In sum, we would expect career staff to take the long and principled
view, while political appointees would take the short and ideological view.
And yet, according to Mark Posner, a former career lawyer in the Civil
Rights Division:
This partnership between the career staff and the Assistant Attorney General (and his political aides) historically has worked
extraordinarily well. AAGs in both Democratic and Republican Administrations have had great respect for, and have been
28.
For a general discussion, see Jerry L. Mashaw, Agency Statutory Interpretation, in
Philip Frickey, ed., Issues in Legal Scholarship: Dynamic Statutory Interpretation (Berkeley, CA:
Berkeley Electronic Press, 2002), online: Berkeley Electronic Press http://www.bepress.
com/ils/iss3/art9.
29.
Cornelia T L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in Executive Hands,
103 MicHi. L.REv. 676,704 (2005).
30.
For a contrary view, see Edward Blum, Roger Clegg & Abigail Thernstrom,
Miho's Playing Politics? It's the Left, not the Right, that's out of order in Texas, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Jan 24, 2006) (last visited July 19, 2006) ("The career bureaucrats who
wrote [the Texas merno]-one of whom now works for a left-leaning advocacy groupseemed to be intent on savingTexas Democratic incumbents any way they could.").
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substantially3 guided by, the knowledge and expertise of the
career staff.

1

This conclusion is implicitly buttressed by the data offered in the first
Part. The enforcement data for the Nixon and Reagan administrations
demand an explanation, and Posner's account offers as good an explanation as we have seen. This explanation hinges, of course, on the degree of
discretion afforded by the statute to the Attorney General. As the next
section contends, this is a question that occupied the attention of the 89th
Congress. In granting the Attorney General any discretion at all, Congress
confronted the issue of over- and under-enforcement.
B. Pre-clearance,Discretion, and the Department ofJustice
Early discussions in Congress over the role of the Department of
Justice in enforcing the preclearance requirement are scant at best. One
reason for this lack of discussion on such an important issue is the fact
that the initial version of the bill did not grant any preclearance authority
to the Attorney General;32 covered jurisdictions were to seek preclearance
in federal court in D.C. Another reason is that the bill sought to curtail
the discretion of those in charge of implementing the Act by proposing
"an objective standard" for establishing instances of racial discrimination.33
This meant that the role of the DOJ would be minimal, perhaps nonexistent; once the trigger kicked in, literacy tests would be banned for ten
34
years and any new laws would need judicial preclearance. Unsurprisingly, the bulk of the debate focused instead, inter alia, on the professed
objectivity of this standard, as members of Congress aimed many of their
questions to the Attorney General at the rationality of the trigger formula.35
Scant as the evidence may be, there is some of it, and this Part considers it. In particular, this section examines the preclearance requirement
as understood and debated by members of Congress. In doing so, it dis31.
32.

Posner, supra note 27, at 9.
See H.R. 6400, 89th Cong. ý 8 (1965).

Voting Rights Act: Hearings on H.R. 6400 Before Subcomm. No. 5 of the House
33.
Comm. on the Judiciary,89th Cong. 24 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 House Hearings].
Id.
34.
See, e.g., id. at 450 (statement of Representative Reinecke). Senator Ervin made
35.
this point often during the Senate hearings. See Voting Rights Act: Hearings on S. 1564 Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong. 33 (1965) [hereinafter 1965 Senate Hearings]
("I do not think there is necessarily any logical connection between the assumption based
on these percentages and the presumption that there was a violation of the 14th Amendment."); id. at 272 (criticizing the coverage of the bill and branding the legislation a
"cockeyed bill"); id. at 263 (complaining that the statutory test has no relation to the discrimination in registration); see also id. at 265 (contending that the triggering test is
arbitrary) (statement of Senator Bloch).
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cusses the preclearance provision and its application, as well as criticisms
of this power. This Part concludes that Congress and the Johnson Administration understood the preclearance requirement as a backstop provision,
its existence an acknowledgement of congressional limitations in the area.
Congress was fully aware that Black voters needed the helpful hand of the
national government and it was willing to lend this hand for ten years, as
states inevitably sought to circumvent the proscriptions of the Act in a
myriad of unforeseen ways. The political market in the South was clearly
broken, and would continue to be so. In this vein, while the Act as a
whole sought to restore this market to its proper balance, the preclearance
provision may be understood as protecting this balance into the future.
1. Section 5 in Congress: 1965
According to Attorney General Katzenbach, the justification behind
the preclearance requirement was quite apparent: the jurisdictions covered
by the trigger formula were the same jurisdictions that have demonstrated
a "desire in a sense to outguess the courts of the United States or even to
outguess the Congress of the United States."36 He offered as examples the
voting qualification requirements implemented by the States of Louisiana,
Mississippi and Alabama following the 1964 Civil Rights Act "for no
other purpose other than to perpetuate racial discrimination.' 37 In light of
this history, he argued that these states "should be subjected to some kind
of limitation as to any new legislation that [they] might propose."38 Or put
another way, Assistant Attorney General Burke Marshall explained, "The
procedure under Section [5] really, in a way, is a method of bringing to
the attention of the Government changes in State law."39
The issue cut deeper than mere changes in the law, however. The
problem was not that state laws changed periodically, for laws always do.
Rather, the issue facing the administration and members of Congress was
the fact that state actors hell-bent on circumventing federal antidiscrimination statutes had managed to stay ahead of the law in the past.
Their ingenuity was bound to increase with the passage of the law. As Attorney General Katzenbach explained during the 1975 Senate hearings,
"When we drafted this legislation, we recognized that increased black
voting strength might encourage a shift in the tactics of discrimination."4 °
Or as civil rights attorney Joseph Rauh put it,
36.
37.

See 1965 House Hearings,supra note 33, at 60.
Id.

38.
39.

Id.
Id. at 72.

40.
Extension of the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 407, S. 903, S. 1297, S.
1409, and S. 1443 Before Subcomm. on Const. Rights of the Senate Connn. on theJudiciary,94th
Cong. 123 (1975) [hereinafter 1975 Senate Hearings].
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This procedure in section 5 which we are demanding and
which Congress gave us because of the terror against blacks,
was based on the concept that it was the only way to get action before the election ... Until they can show not only that
they do not shoot black voters any more, which I accept, and
even if they want to say that they do not do a lot of things any
more, they cannot say that they have not violated section 5,
41
and that is what counts.
Section 5 thus served as an insurance provision, designed as further protection against unknown and uncertain developments by covered
jurisdictions. In the words of Representative Cramer, "What you are doing, in effect, is granting a presumption against the local4 2community. They
have to come to Washington to prove their innocence.''
As with most things in life, the devil was in the details.The difficulty,
the Attorney General well understood, was the fact that "[e]ven in a sense
a most innocent kind of law, as our experiences have indicated time and
time again, can be used."43 Some matters were simple enough, such as reductions in the voting age from 21 years to 18 years, or changes in
residency requirements from 12 months to 6 months.14 In response to a
question from Chairman Celler, the Attorney General conceded that
states would still have to go to district court to preclear such changes, but
the United States would not oppose them, "unless the United States were
capable of making a case with respect to the effect of the proposed
change of law. The effect would have to be one of denying the rights
guaranteed by the 15th Amendment."' 45 Under this standard, a change
from 46nonregistration to registration would require a declaratory judgment, or changing the hours of a registrar's office to one hour on one
day, every two months.4 Conversely, changing from paper ballots to a machine would not seem to qualify.4" But the issue was far from simple, and
some members of Congress worried that the provision as drafted might
not protect Blacks into the future, in light of the ingenuity of some

Id. at 62.
1965 House Hearings, supra note 33, at 95.
Id. at 62.
See id. at 60.
Id.; see id. at 62 (stating that the change "may not likely have the effect of deny45.
ing or abridging rights guaranteed by the 15th Amendment") (statement of Chairman
Celler).
Id. at 62.
46.
See id. According to the Attorney General, "There is very little opportunity
47.
under those circumstances for Negroes who have not been registered in the past to get
registered." Id.
See id.
48.
41.
42.
43.
44.
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states,49 while others offered amendments to the proposed language that
50
would expand the reach of the preclearance requirement.
In the end, the words of Representative Mathias properly encapsulate the essence of the new law. As he argued, "[State legislators] are going
to be baffled by the fact that their enactments are really put on ice, or that
their State legislatures are put in trusteeship during the period under
which they may be subject to this bill."9 1 Critics and supporters alike
agreed about this characterization. When it came to the conditions that
gave rise to this legislation, however, they found much room for disagreement.
2. The Role of Discretion
Chairman Celler justified the preclearance provision on the view
that "we are facing harsh conditions and we may have to have harsh
laws."" 2 The Attorney General disagreed, of course; in his view, this provision was not harsh, but "effective.""3 Critics of the Act sided with
Chairman Celler's view of the law. To a person, they charged that the
proposed legislation was harsh, and unfairly so. For example, critics argued
that the legislation was arbitrary, unfair, and ultimately unconstitutional in
singling out Southern States for punishment.,4 This section focuses on
one important strand of the criticism: the level of discretion afforded the
Attorney General by the Act.
The issue of discretion arose in two separate contexts. Under the
original section 9(e) of the Act, a person who joined the voting lists as
provided by the Act, yet was not allowed to vote, or suspected that her
vote was not counted, could inform federal examiners of such allegations.
The federal examiner would then notify the Attorney General, who "may
forthwith apply to the district court for an order enjoining certification of
the results of the election.""9 Representative Kastenmeier wished for
49.
See id. at 291 ("I am fearful that we may be inviting the situation where some
States, ingenious as they are, local registration people and local chiefs of police, will find
new ways and means of disenfranchising people if we lock ourselves into a particular definition, which is the case of the administration bill.") (statement of Representative
Lindsay).
See id. at 767 (statement of Rep. Edwards). Tellingly, Representative Edwards
50.
offered a modification to the language that would "preclude other devices which might be
used to discriminate, such as changing the boundaries of voting districts or qualifications
for holding offices." Id.
51.
Id. at 371.
52.
Id. at 62.
53.
Id.
54.
For a review of these criticisms, see Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Legislative Findings,
Congressional Powers, and the Future of the Voting Rights Act (draft) (Sept. 5, 2005), Indiana
Legal Studies Research Paper No. 34, available at http://sssrn.com/abstract=781805.
55.
S. 1564, 89th Cong. 5 9(e) (1965).
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stronger language, as he complained that the Attorney General may
choose not to act on the allegation if the outcome of the election will not
be affected. But this was a problem from the perspective of the aggrieved
voter; it was "very important ... that a specific procedure be followed and

that some relief be obtained so that they may not, thereafter, be discouraged by virtue, ultimately, of a lack of encouragement to vote.""6 The
Assistant Attorney General, Burke Marshall, responded that discretion in
this area was important." But Kastenmeier was not so sure: I realize you
require some discretion. However, this language (from section 9(e)) is
quite open-ended as to what standards, in fact, the U.S. Attorney may apply as to the decision to institute these cases.""
The issue came up again during the Senate hearings. The Attorney
General broached this issue himself, during an exchange with Senator
Ervin about the proposed power to send examiners to covered areas to
register voters. To the Senator, this would be "a drastic power which can
hardly be reconciled with the federal system of government, if we still
have a federal system of government."' 9 The Attorney General conceded
that this "is quite a strong power."6' He continued:
Now, there may be better ways of accomplishing this. I do not
know if there are. There are some here I can imagine, a good
many provisions of State law, that could be changed that would
not in any way abridge or deny the right; we, perhaps, except
for the fact that some members of the committee, I think, including yourself [Sen. Ervin], have had difficulty with giving
the Attorney General discretion on some of these thingsperhaps this could be improved by applying it only to those
laws which the Attorney General takes exception to within a
given period of time. Perhaps that would remove some of the
burdens.61
In subsequent days, the issue of granting the Attorney General any discretion arose once more. Under the original section 5(a) of the bill,
examiners would register voters if these voters applied to register within
the prior 90 days yet were denied by a person acting under color of law.
Under a proviso, however, the Attorney General could waive this requirement. In reference to this proviso, Senator Ervin asked a witness: "Do

56.
1965 House Hearings,supra note 33, at 71.
57.
Id. at 72 ("I think, myself, Congressman, it would be a mistake to remove from
the Department ofJustice the decision as to whether or not it thinks a case is a good case
to bring.").
58.
Id.
59.
1965 Senate Hearings,supra note 33, at 237.
60.
Id.
61.
Id.
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you believe that the Attorney General should have an unbridled discretion without any guidelines or standards to waive the requirement of
law?"6 2 The rest of this exchange is worth quoting at length:
[Witness:] With the greatest deference to the occupants of that
post, sir, I believe that is excessive authority to vest in the
hands of the Attorney General.
[Senator Ervin:] Is not the proud boast of our country that we
have a government of laws and not of men?
[Witness:] That is the theory to which we are pledged.
[Senator Ervin:] And this bill is establishing the government of
man, in this particular field?
63
[Witness:] Yes, sir.

To Senator Ervin, this grant of authority to the Attorney General was
"excessive" because the delegation was not accompanied by any guiding
standards. Without such standards, legitimate authority became raw power,
to be used at will against the offending jurisdictions. In this vein, consider
the words of Representative Waggoner: "The bill recognizes no reluctance
to discriminate against these Southern States and make them the whipping boys for the nation.''4
Four years later, the arguments sharpened considerably. The supporters offered a similar justification: while the preclearance provision "is an
extraordinary provision of the law ... it is required by the extraordinary
,,65
circumstances.
In response, Senator Ervin offered his old criticism of
the role of the Attorney General, as forcefully as before. For example, he
complained that Section 5 "subordinates the decisions of the elected representatives of the people in the States to the66unreviewable whims of an
executive official of the Federal Government."
But this time around, he had support from the Attorney General,
John Mitchell. Their positions were similar and, unlike the 1965 debates,
the two were far more pointed in connecting their criticism to a larger
separation of powers critique. For example, Senator Ervin implied early
on that Section 5 "give[s] judicial power to an executive officer."67 A day
62.
Id. at 651,
63.
Id.
64.
1965 House Hearings, supra note 33, at 709.
65.
Amendments to the Voting Rights Act of 1965: Hearings on S. 818, 2456, 2507 and
Title IV of S. 2029 Before the Senate Subcomm. on Const. Rights, 91st Cong. 17 (1969) [hereinafter 1969 Senate Hearings] (Senator Mathias).
66.
Id. at 257.
67.
Id.; see id. at 199 ("I do not favor putting the power to pass on validity of laws in
an executive official.").
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later, he was far more direct: "The Attorney General condemns you without trial, without evidence, on the basis of failures. Then you are guilty and
then you have to come and bring witnesses.",6' Time and again, Senator
Ervin leveled a similar charge," while also concluding that "the processes
provided under which the Attorney General must make a decision are not
adequate. They result in arbitrary decisions without sufficient information.",70 Senator Ervin was also troubled by the fact that the Attorney
General "also happens to be a political appointee who generally has more
than a little appreciation of partisan politics.'' 7' He concluded that "there is

no good reason why this enormous power should be lodged in that office.""2
Congress ultimately extended the special provisions of the Act for
another five years. Of note, the DOJ issued its first set of procedures for
administering the Voting Rights Act a year later, in 1971."' According to
these procedures, "Section 5 ... imposes on the Attorney General what is
essentially a judicial function.''71 More specifically, the Attorney General
must be "satisfied" that the submitted changes do not have a discriminatory purpose or effect. If she "determines" that the submitted changes
have such discriminatory purpose or effect, she must interpose an objection.7 ' The Supreme Court upheld this codified regulatory scheme in
1973.76

C. Discretion and the Court: Deference?
The question of administrative discretion and the role of the Attorney General in enforcing the proscriptions of the Act has played a central
role in the doctrinal development of Section 5. In the early case of Perkins

68.
69.

Id. at 86.
Id. at 224 (contending that section 5 is simply ineffective, as "determinations as

to whether legislation or ordinances discriminate under section 5, properly belongs in the
court").
70.
Id. at 204; id. at 232 ("[H]aving lived with it I [do] not think [DOJ] was the
proper place for a determination of whether statutes are or are not going to be used in a
discriminatory fashion."); id. at 233 (complaining that the best he could do under section
5 was to "try and guess as to the effect of the legislation"); see also id. at 239 ("1 thought
[section 5] was wrong because it put into the hands of an appointed political officer of
another branch of the Government the right to veto, in effect, the legislative act of a State
legislature. It was wrong because it is difficult to judge a law, or a draft of a law, in a vacuum.") (Senator Hruska).
71.
Id. at 257.
72.
Id.
73.
28 C.EFR. • 51.1 (1972).
74.
28 CER. § 51.19 (1972).
75.
Id.
76.
See Georgia v. United States, 411 U.S. 526,536-39 (1973).
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v. Matthews,77 for example, the Court supported its holding that annexations and the location of polling places were subject to section 5 review
by pointing to prior interpretations of the Act by the Attorney General."
The Court seemed to suggest that this issue was not a matter of statutory
interpretation unique to the Voting Rights Act; rather, this was standing
doctrine on the question of how much deference the Court would show
to interpretations of a statute by the officials or agencies entrusted with its
implementation.'" In subsequent cases, however, the Court intimated that
this reading of the Attorney General's power is particularly appropriate to
its role under section 5.80
The question of how much deference the Court would accord to
the Attorney General's interpretations of the Act acquired great urgency
at the time of Perkins, as the new regulations marked the beginning of
greater enforcement of the preclearance requirement. 8 But the Court
hardly missed a step. In Georgia v. United States,5 2 the state of Georgia challenged the regulations on the view that the Act did not authorize the
Attorney General to issue them. The Court agreed that the statute was
silent on many questions at the heart of the Attorney General's duties under section 5."' Yet the Attorney General followed a reasonable path:
"Rather than reading the statute to grant him unfettered discretion as to
procedures, standards, and administration in this sensitive area, the Attorney General has chosen instead to formulate and publish objective ground
rules.'""' So long as these regulations were reasonable, they were not beyond his authority.5
Justice White dissented in Georgia, in language that bears directly on
our inquiry. He questioned whether "any objection whatsoever" from the
Attorney General would be enough to force the offending state into federal

77.
400 U.S. 379 (1971).
78.
See id. at 390-91 ("Our conclusion that both the location of the polling places
and municipal boundary changes come within s 5 draws further support from the interpretation followed by the Attorney General in his administration of the statute.").
79.
For support, the Court cited Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) ("[T]his
Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or
agency charged with its administration.").
80.
See, e.g., United States v. Sheffield Bd. of Comm'rs, 435 U.S. 110, 131 (1978)
("In recognition of the Attorney General's key role in the formulation of the Act, this
Court in the past has given great deference to his interpretations of it.").
81.
See, e.g., 1975 Senate Hearings, supra note 40, at 83 ("It has been since the regulations for the administration of section 5 were put forth, I believe in September of 1971,
that there has been pretty good enforcement of section 5.") (testimony of David Hunter,
Attorney and Staff member, U.S. Commission on Civil R-ights).
82.
411 U.S. 526 (1973).
83.
See id. at 536.
84.
Id.
85.
See id.
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court to defend its change in the law.16 More particularly, he questioned
whether "Congress intended to visit upon the States the consequences of
such uncontrolled discretion in the Attorney General.,, 8' He continued:
Surely, objections by the Attorney General would not be valid
if that officer considered himself too busy to give attention to
5 5 submissions and simply decided to object to all of them, to
one out of 10 of them or to those filed by States with governors
of a different political persuasion. Neither, I think, did Congress
anticipate that the Attorney General could discharge his statutory duty by simply stating that he had not been persuaded that
a proposed change in election procedures would not have the
forbidden discriminatory effect. 8
Justice White understood the statute to constrain the Attorney General's
discretion far more than that. At the very least, the Attorney General must
"give his careful and good-faith consideration"8" within sixty days of
submission and decide whether the proposed change had the requisite
discriminatory purpose or effect. Only then may the Attorney General
object to the change.
In subsequent cases, the Court held on to its broad and forgiving
view of the Attorney General's role in interpreting the Act. In United
States v. Sheffield Bd. of Conm'rs,90 for example, the Court used the Attorney General's interpretation of the Act and his role in drafting the
legislation for support of its holding. 91 Similarly, in Dougherty County v.
"White,92 the Court cited the Attorney General's "central role ... in formulating and implementing 5 5" in concluding that her interpretation of the
statute "is entitled to particular deference.'" And in NA.A.C.P v. Hampton County Election Comm'n,9 ' the Court reiterated its long-standing view
that "the construction placed upon95the Act by the Attorney General ... is
entitled to considerable deference.'"
But, as the Court made clear five years later, this deference was not
unfettered deference, for "the principle has its limits., 9 6 The Court has of86.

Id. at 542-43 (White,J., dissenting).

87.
88.
89.

Id.
Id.
Id.

90.

435 U.S. 110 (1978).

91.
See id. at 131-32.
92.
439 U.S. 32 (1978).
93.
Id. at 39.
94.
470 U.S. 166 (1985).
95.
Id. at 178-79; see also City of Pleasant Grove v. United States, 479 U.S. 462, 468
(1987) (explaining that "the Attorney General['s] ... interpretation of the Voting Rights
Act is entitled to considerable deference").
96.
Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 502 U.S. 491,508 (1992)
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fered at least three such limits in recent cases. Citing Chevron, 97 the Court
contended in Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n that "[d]eference does not
mean acquiescence. As in other contexts in which we defer to an administrative interpretation of a statute, we do so only if Congress has not
expressed its intent with respect to the question, and then only if the administrative interpretation is reasonable."'' One limit thus looks to
congressional intent, while a second limit demands a reasonable interpretation of the relevant statute.
In another line of cases, the Court offered a third limitation. In Shaw
v. Reno,99 the Court subjected racial gerrymandering claims created under
the purported authority of the Voting Rights Act to constitutional review.
More specifically, the racially gerrymandered districts were created in response to a preclearance objection from the Attorney General. The Court
concluded that these districts must be subject to strict scrutiny review't0
In response, the state of Georgia contended in Miller v. Johnson"'° that
compliance with a preclearance mandate was a compelling state interest, a
position with which a majority of the Court disagreed as a general
proposition.'10 In so doing, the Court offered a third limit on the Attorney
General's authority. Namely, administrative interpretations of the Act are
not entitled to judicial deference when these interpretations "raise serious
constitutional questions."""

This Part reaches two related conclusions. In 1965, through its preclearance requirement, Congress codified its understanding of the Act
into the future. Many critics of the voting rights bill worried about the
degree of discretion that the legislation accorded the Attorney General.
Supporters worried as well, fearing that this degree of discretion might
lead to under-enforcement of the Act.1°Yet Congress chose not to act on
those concerns while placing the DOJ at the center of its voting rights

97.
(1984).
98.
99.

100.

Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44
502 U.S. at 508 (quoting Chevron U.S.A. INC., 467 U.S. at 842-44).
509 U.S. 630 (1993).

Id. at 653.

101.
515 U.S. 900 (1995).
102.
Id. at 922 ("We do not accept the contention that the State has a compelling
interest in complying with whatever preclearance mandates the Justice Department issues."). But see League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2667
(2006) (Scalia,J., dissenting) ("If compliance with 5 5 were not a compelling state interest,
then a State could be placed in the impossible position of having to choose between compliance with 5 5 and compliance with the Equal Protection Clause.").
103.
Miller, 515 U.S. at 923.
104.
See, e.g., 1965 House Hearings,supra note 33, at 72.
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revolution. By and large, this is the way that the Supreme Court has understood the Department's role.
CONCLUSION
In his opinion for the Court in Luther v. Borden,'O° ChiefJustice Taney
opined, in reference to the executive power to call the militia to quell domestic insurrections: "It is said that this power in the President is dangerous
to liberty, and may be abused." Nevertheless, he continued, "All power may
be abused if placed in unworthy hands. But it would be difficult, we think,
this power would be more safe,
to point out any other hands in which
10 6
and at the same time equally effectual."'
Though he was not, Chief Justice Taney could have been referring
to the preclearance power under the Act. Congress was fully aware of the
dangers inherent in placing the preclearance power in executive hands.
The power could be abused, to be sure, yet the exigencies of the task at
hand demanded both flexibility and the ability to act quickly. Thus, Congress placed considerable trust in future Attorney Generals to carry out
this important work. And according to Assistant Attorney General Burke
Marshall, "I think that the Attorney General and I think that the United
States is committed to this course of action, no matter who is Attorney
is President and can count on the vigorous enforcement
General or 0who
7
of the act"',
Contemporary debates over the role played by the DOJ in enforcing
the Act must contend with this history. Enforcement of the preclearance
requirement is a matter of both discretion and trust. This is an important
point, particularly in reference to the political fortunes of communities of
color. Section 5 was a radical proposal designed to combat years of outright neglect. Learning from its recent history with this problem,
Congress chose to bypass traditional judicial remedies and processes while
vesting the preclearance power on the Attorney General. This assured efficient enforcement, yet it also meant that future Attorney Generals who
did not share the political vision of the 89th Congress could choose to
under-enforce the equality norm embodied in Section 5. This was part of
the bargain from the beginning. Concededly, this means that the voting
rights of communities of color under Section 5 of the Act are subject to
the ebbs and flows of politics. But we are not convinced that this is as
noxious a development as some commentators believe.
The concept of a preclearance requirement presupposes a broken
political market, where political actors are unable to bargain with similarly
situated participants. This is no longer the world we live in. Unlike the
105.

48 U.S. 1 (1849).

106.
107.

Id. at 44.
1965 House Hearings,supra note 33, at 72.
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political milieu that gave rise to the act in 1965, this is a time when
communities of color can do their bidding through the traditional workings of the political process. In fact, it may be said that the recent
amendment and extension of the Act offer conclusive proof for this
proposition.
More importantly, to take the position that the Attorney General
must aggressively enforce the Voting Rights Act is to believe that the Attorney General must act as a surrogate for the voting rights of
communities of color. It is also to believe that the Attorney General
knows what is best for these communities.Yet, it is not always clear what
is best for communities of color; what is best for communities of color in
this day and age may best be determined by the political process. Take, for
example, the debate of the last decade over the creation of minority majority districts. Should the DOJ pursue a policy of maximizing such
districts, or should it instead encourage the creation of influence districts?'0 8 Both positions hold considerable appeal. It is not clear that we
would want the DOJ pursuing one policy exclusively at the expense of
another in the face of such uncertainty. Additionally, allowing enforcement of the Act to ebb and flow might reduce concern over its
constitutionality where the constitutional worry is that an aggressive DOJ
will always try to maximize enforcement.
The allure of Section 5 rested in great measure on the discretion it
vested on the Attorney General to use its considerable power as she
deemed necessary. If the price we must pay for Section 5 is occasional
under-enforcement, this is a price we are willing to pay.
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